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Accounting Quality and Debt Concentration 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration in corporate capital 
structures (i.e., firms’ tendency to rely predominantly on only a few types of debt). Motivated by 
theoretical and empirical research that supports a strong link between debt concentration and 
creditors’ coordination costs and the importance of accounting quality in reducing these costs, we 
hypothesize that firms with higher accounting quality have less concentrated debt structures. 
Measuring accounting quality with a comprehensive index based on the occurrence of material 
internal control weaknesses, accounting restatements, SEC AAERs, and firms’ reliance on small 
auditors, we find that higher accounting quality is indeed associated with less concentrated debt 
structures. This relation is stronger for firms with higher default risk, as the probability that 
creditors need to coordinate is higher, and for firms with lower liquidation values, as creditor 
coordination to avoid liquidation is more important.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent studies have documented significant heterogeneity in the mix of debt types that firms 
use (e.g., Rauh and Sufi 2010; Colla et al. 2013). Many firms rely on multiple types of debt 
simultaneously (e.g., commercial paper, term loans, lines of credit, senior bonds, subordinated 
bonds) and the degree of debt concentration – the extent to which firms rely on only a few types 
of debt (or even a single debt type) – varies widely across firms. However, despite a large 
theoretical literature on debt structures (e.g., Berglöf and von Thadden 1994; Bolton and 
Scharfstein 1996; Park 2000; Bris and Welch 2005), our understanding of the empirical 
determinants of debt concentration remains far from being complete. In this study, to advance this 
understanding, we examine the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration.  
Our research is motivated by prior literature suggesting that a dispersed debt structure makes 
debt renegotiation more difficult because it is difficult for multiple creditors to coordinate (e.g., 
Asquith et al. 1994). Further, different debt types often include cross-acceleration or cross-default 
provisions (Beatty et al. 2012), so that the resolution of financial distress requires coordination not 
only within but also across debt types. Coordination across types, however, may be difficult 
because different debt types typically have different cash flow claims, control provisions, 
collateral, and seniority, and the different types’ owners may differ in investment horizon or 
objective. Using multiple debt types simultaneously can thus increase creditor coordination costs 
(Ayotte and Morrison 2009; Lou and Otto 2020).1 In other words, when a firm’s debt structure 
comprises a larger number of different types of debt, conflicts and free-rider problems among the 
creditors are likely to increase and make it more difficult to agree on restructuring procedures 
                                                             
1 Intuitively, if different creditors hold different types of claims against the borrower, the potential for disagreement 
and conflict among the creditors is larger than if all creditors hold the same type of claim. 
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when the firm defaults and on the division of its assets in the case of bankruptcy (e.g., Asquith et 
al. 1994; Berglöf and von Thadden 1994; Colla et al. 2013; Ivashina et al. 2016). 
The upside of making it difficult to renegotiate the debt is that this deters strategic defaults 
(i.e., defaulting despite being able to service the debt). The downside is that it also increases the 
probability of an inefficient liquidation (e.g., liquidating a borrower that is economically solvent 
but short on cash).2 The value maximizing debt structure trades off these benefits and costs of debt 
dispersion (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein 1996). Hence, as “efficient corporate policies should aim 
at maximizing the size of the corporate pie” (Tirole 2006, p. 78), we expect that borrowers weigh 
the benefits of deterring strategic defaults against the costs of inefficient liquidations when 
choosing the dispersion in their debt structures.3 We build on this framework and on the notion 
that high quality accounting information can increase the probability of successful creditor 
coordination and decrease the costs of coordination failure (e.g., increase liquidation values). 
Prior studies have recognized the critical role of information for default resolution (e.g., 
Senbet and Wang 2012; Ayotte and Skeel 2013). High quality accounting information helps 
creditors better assess a firm’s future cash flows and thus mitigates asymmetric information and 
disagreement among different debt holders. As a consequence, high quality accounting 
information increases the likelihood of efficient renegotiation outcomes in a private workout, 
which is substantially less costly than Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures. Further, 
even if out-of-court negotiations fail, high quality accounting numbers can improve the efficiency 
                                                             
2 A borrower is considered economically solvent when the present value of its future cash flows exceeds its total 
obligations (Wruck 1990).   
3 Strategic defaults reduce the expected repayments to creditors and, in turn, the creditors’ willingness to lend. 
Consequently, while strategic defaults are beneficial to the borrower and detrimental to the creditors ex post, the 
associated costs are ultimately borne by the borrower, who suffers from a lower borrowing capacity ex ante and thus 
a lower ability to finance new projects.  
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of the formal bankruptcy procedures. In Chapter 11, where a reorganization plan must be accepted 
by at least one class of impaired creditors and confirmed by the court, accounting information 
plays an important role in determining whether the plan is fair and equitable (Warner 1977; Weiss 
1990; Wruck 1990). Finally, if a firm enters Chapter 7, by reducing information acquisition and 
processing costs, high quality accounting information can help achieve a higher liquidation value.  
Hence, as high accounting quality reduces the costs of debt dispersion by reducing the risk 
and costs of creditor coordination failure, we predict that firms with higher accounting quality have 
more dispersed debt structures (i.e., use multiple debt types).4 This prediction is further supported 
by the finding that lenders price financial distress costs (Hoshi et al. 1990; Gertner and Scharfstein 
1991; Giammarino 1989), which include bankruptcy costs related to creditor coordination failure. 
To reduce the expected costs of financial distress and, consequently, the cost of debt financing, 
firms with low accounting quality should thus rely on more concentrated debt structures. 
To test this prediction, we measure firms’ debt concentration in two ways. First, following 
Colla et al. (2013), we compute a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) across the 
different types of debt used by the firms (commercial paper, term loans, lines of credit, senior 
bonds, subordinated bonds, capital leases, and other debt). Second, we count the number of 
different debt types that the firms use. To assess firms’ accounting quality, we construct an index 
based on the occurrence of material internal control weaknesses (ICWs), accounting restatements, 
SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), and firms’ reliance on small 
auditors. In doing so, we follow an extensive literature that identifies ICWs, restatements, and 
                                                             
4 Note here the distinction between concentration/dispersion across different types of debt and concentrated/dispersed 
ownership of claims within a given type. Our interest is in the former construct, i.e., in whether firms borrow 
predominantly using a single type of debt or rely on multiple debt types at the same time, rather than firms’ choice 
between, e.g., private loans with concentrated ownership and public bonds with dispersed ownership. 
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AAERs as common measures of accounting quality and emphasizes that auditors are an important 
determinant of accounting quality (e.g., Beneish et al. 2008; Palmrose et al. 2004; Dechow et al.  
1996; Lennox and Pittman 2010; Dechow et al. 2010; DeFond and Zhang 2014).   
We then examine the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration in a sample 
of U.S. public firms from 2003 to 2017. An important challenge is that accounting quality is not 
randomly assigned. To help mitigate this concern, we control for firm and year fixed effects (e.g., 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Valta 2012; Christensen et al. 2016). We further control for the 
determinants of firms’ debt structures and time-varying characteristics that may affect accounting 
quality suggested by prior research (e.g., Rauh and Sufi 2010; Colla et al. 2013; Doyle et al. 2007; 
Efendi et al. 2007; Chang et al. 2009). Consistent with our prediction, we find that firms with 
higher accounting quality have significantly less concentrated debt structures, i.e., a lower debt 
HHI and a higher number of debt types. Economically, an increase in the accounting quality index 
by one notch is associated with a decrease (increase) in the debt HHI (number of debt types) by 
6.3 (5.7) percent of the average within-firm standard deviation of the HHI (number of debt types).  
To provide further support for our hypothesis, we examine whether the relation between 
accounting quality and debt concentration is more pronounced for firms with higher default risk 
and lower liquidation values. The idea is that creditor coordination is needed with a higher 
likelihood if the probability of default is higher and that creditor coordination to avoid liquidat ion 
is more important if liquidation values are low. In line with this intuition, we find that the relation 
between accounting quality and debt concentration is indeed stronger for firms with highly 
speculative grade credit ratings, firms with high cash flow volatility, firms with low Altman’s 
(1968) z-scores, and firms with low liquidation values (estimated following Berger et al. 1996). 
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These results not only suggest that the relation between accounting quality and debt 
concentration is indeed driven by creditor coordination costs but also alleviate endogeneity 
concerns: It is difficult to argue that omitted variables alone account for the collective set of results 
from our primary and cross-sectional tests. In additional robustness tests, we further show that our 
findings continue to hold when we employ a changes analysis or propensity score matching, or 
control for additional debt structure features. Supplementary, untabulated tests confirm that our 
results are robust to using alternative measures of debt concentration and accounting quality.  
Our paper’s key contribution is to document the important role of accounting quality for 
firms’ debt concentration decisions. Specifically, we show that firms with higher accounting 
quality have less concentrated debt structures: They use multiple, different types of debt at the 
same time (e.g., loans, bonds, commercial paper) rather than specialize on any one type. This 
finding is important because the contemporaneous use of multiple debt types “is a first-order aspect 
of firm capital structure” (Rauh and Sufi 2010, p. 4277), whose determinants are not yet well 
understood. As such, our contribution is to advance this understanding by documenting the role of 
accounting quality for firms’ choice between more or less concentrated debt structures.  
Prior studies on the role of accounting quality in debt markets, in contrast, have focused on 
firms’ choice between different types of debt (e.g., Bharath et al. 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Beatty 
et al. 2010), ownership concentration within loan syndicates (e.g., Ball et al. 2008), and price and 
non-price contract terms (e.g., Graham et al. 2008; Zhang 2008; Costello and Wittenberg-
Moerman 2011; Kim et al. 2011; Christensen and Nikolaev 2012). Importantly, however, these 
studies do not speak to the relation between accounting quality and firms’ choice to use multiple 
types of debt simultaneously. Apart from its focus on concentration vs. dispersion across different 
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debt types, our study also differs from existing work in terms of the key economic mechanism that 
drives the predictions. Specifically, our study builds on the idea that higher accounting quality 
implies a higher optimal level of debt dispersion because higher accounting quality makes a 
dispersed debt structure less costly. At the core of this argument is the insight that higher 
accounting quality reduces coordination costs among lenders of different debt types and increases 
liquidation values. Existing studies, instead, focus on the effect of accounting quality on 
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders (Bharath et al. 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; 
Beatty et al. 2010) or between the lead arranger and syndicate participants (Ball et al. 2008).  
Most closely related to our work is Ball et al. (2008), which argues that higher accounting 
quality allows lead arrangers to hold smaller proportions of syndicated loans because it reduces 
agency problems within the lending syndicate that originate from lead arrangers’ information 
advantage. However, whereas Ball et al. (2008) examines how accounting quality helps mitigate 
information asymmetry within loan syndicates at loan issuance, we study how high quality 
accounting information reduces coordination problems between different classes of creditors upon 
default. As such, our study provides further support for the important role of accounting 
information in helping distinct lenders coordinate their interests and thereby enhances our 
understanding of the multifaceted role of accounting quality in debt markets. 
II. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Prior studies propose the simultaneous use of different debt types as an important feature of 
corporate debt structures. Rauh and Sufi (2010) find that for almost three-quarters of the firm-year 
observations, firms rely on more than two different types of debt. They also find that one quarter 
of firms experience no significant year-on-year changes in debt levels but significant changes in 
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debt composition. Colla et al. (2013) show that the extent to which firms borrow from multiple 
sources varies widely across firms: Large, rated firms tend to diversify across multiple debt types, 
while small, unrated firms tend to specialize on a smaller number of types. They further suggest 
potential economic benefits associated with the use of fewer debt types, such as lower bankruptcy 
costs, economies in information collection costs, and lenders’ enhanced incentives to monitor. 
The above findings are broadly consistent with the large theoretical literature on firms’ debt 
structures (e.g., Diamond 1991a, 1991b, 1993; Berglöf and von Thadden 1994; Park 2000; Bris 
and Welch 2005; Zhong 2018). A major insight from this literature is that a dispersed debt structure 
makes debt renegotiation more difficult because it is difficult for multiple creditors to coordinate 
and agree on the debt restructuring procedures when the borrower defaults and on the division of 
its assets in the case of bankruptcy (e.g., Gertner and Scharfstein 1991; Asquith et al. 1994; Berglöf 
and von Thadden 1994; Bolton and Scharfstein 1996; Colla et al. 2013; Ivashina et al. 2016). Using 
multiple debt types simultaneously is likely to increase creditor coordination costs further as debt 
contracts often include cross-acceleration or cross-default provisions (Beatty et al. 2012), so that 
creditors need to coordinate not only within but also across debt types. This, however, is difficult 
because different debt types typically have different cash flow claims, control provisions, 
collateral, or seniority, and are owned by investors with different investment horizons or objectives 
(Ayotte and Morrison 2009; Lou and Otto 2020). Hence, using multiple debt types can make 
creditor coordination more difficult beyond the mere effect of a larger number of creditors. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that conflicts among creditors that hold different types of debt 
are indeed a relevant impediment to the efficient resolution of distress in practice. For example, in 
the case of Radio Shack’s bankruptcy in 2015, one of the company’s major private lenders 
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prevented the closing of 1,000 stores in an attempt to preserve the collateral backing its loan. This 
inhibited the timely resolution of Radio Shack’s financial troubles, which ultimately resulted in a 
Chapter 11 filing, to the detriment of Radio Shack’s other types of creditors – unsecured 
bondholders and other unsecured lenders. Another example is the bankruptcy of Toys ‘R’ Us in 
2017, where unsecured creditors objected to various aspects of a liquidation plan, arguing that it 
unduly prioritized secured private lenders of Toys ‘R’ Us’ term loans, who pushed for a liquidat ion 
instead of a reorganization under Chapter 11. Unsecured creditors threatened to sue the company 
and its private lenders, leading to months of negotiations and jeopardizing a value-maximizing 
liquidation of Toys ‘R’ Us’ assets. A further example is Energy Future Holdings Corp.’s 
bankruptcy in 2014, where the filing of a prepackaged resolution plan (which enables a more 
efficient and quicker bankruptcy process) was severely jeopardized by disagreement between 
senior private lenders and unsecured bondholders. These two types of creditors disagreed over the 
value of the firm’s subsidiaries and tax implications of potential subsidiary spinoffs.  Even after 
large private lenders (mostly hedge funds and private equity funds that had issued term loans) 
agreed on a restructuring plan, unsecured bondholders threatened to challenge this plan in court. 
The upside of a dispersed debt structure (i.e., relying on multiple debt types) is that making 
it difficult to renegotiate the debt deters strategic defaults and thus disciplines the borrower.5 As 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) show, the prospect of bargaining with multiple creditors that are 
unable to coordinate lowers a borrower’s expected payoff from defaulting strategically and thus 
the incentives to do so. The downside of a dispersed debt structure is that not being able to 
renegotiate due to difficulties in creditor coordination also increases the probability of an 
                                                             
5 Apart from deterring strategic defaults, borrowing from multiple sources may also be beneficial if individual lenders 
can fail (Detragiache et al. 2000). It can also mitigate holdup problems between borrowers and lenders (Rajan 1992).  
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inefficient liquidation (e.g., after a liquidity default that is not strategic but due to a temporary lack 
of cash). Further, having to bargain with multiple creditors also deters potential buyers from 
expending resources to learn about the borrower’s assets and, through this channel, reduces the 
expected value at which the assets can be sold in case of a default (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996).  
As “efficient corporate policies should aim at maximizing the size of the corporate pie” 
(Tirole 2006, p. 78), we expect that borrowers choose the debt structure that maximizes total firm 
value.6 This, in turn, is equivalent to choosing the debt structure that minimizes inefficiencies. In 
the conceptual framework outlined above, there are two sources of inefficiencies: inefficient 
liquidations and strategic defaults. Liquidations could be inefficient because liquidation values 
could be lower than going concern values. Strategic defaults are inefficient for two reasons. First, 
they can lead to inefficient liquidations. Second, strategic defaults reduce a firm’s borrowing 
capacity and thus its ability to finance new projects. The intuition is that strategic defaults reduce 
the expected repayments to creditors and, in turn, the creditors’ willingness to lend. Because 
creditors can anticipate the inefficiencies and price protect, the costs of inefficient liquidations and 
strategic defaults are ultimately born by the borrower (Jensen and Meckling 1976). When deciding 
on their debt structure – and, in particular, when choosing between a concentrated or a dispersed 
debt structure – borrowers thus face a trade-off between the benefits of deterring strategic defaults 
and the costs of inefficient liquidations.  
Our empirical predictions build on this framework and on the notion that high quality 
accounting information can increase the probability of successful creditor coordination as well as 
decrease the costs of coordination failure. With respect to creditor coordination, high quality 
                                                             
6 The intuition is that “any increase in the firm’s total value brought about by a change in policy can be divided among 
the claimholders in a way that makes everybody better off.” (Tirole 2006, p. 78) 
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accounting information can help resolve disagreement between different lenders and thus 
contributes to achieving a more efficient default resolution (e.g., Ayotte and Skeel 2013; Senbet 
and Wang 2012). Specifically, by allowing a more accurate assessment of a distressed firm’s 
prospects, high quality accounting information is likely to reduce asymmetric information between 
different classes of debt holders and thereby increases the probability that that they will agree on 
a private workout plan, which is substantially less costly than other default resolutions.7  
Further, higher quality accounting information can also improve the outcome of a formal 
bankruptcy process in case a private workout cannot be achieved. A Chapter 11 reorganization 
plan cannot be confirmed by the court unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired 
class of claims, which can comprise multiple debt types,8 and accounting information plays an 
important role in determining whether such a plan is fair and equitable (Warner 1977; Weiss 1990; 
Wruck 1990). Studying Chapter 11 reorganization plans, Weiss (1990), for example, finds that 
whether a creditor class is impaired is determined primarily based on accounting values. Similar ly , 
examining how courts determine whether creditors’ claims are satisfied, Warner (1977) finds that 
the comparison between old and new debt securities is primarily based on accounting numbers. 
Finally, even in case creditor coordination fails and the firm enters a Chapter 7 liquidat ion, 
better accounting quality can help achieve a higher liquidation value. When assets are sold by 
production unit, which typically yields higher prices than when assets are sold piecemeal, potential 
buyers commonly rely on accounting numbers to estimate a unit’s going concern value. Further, 
                                                             
7 Further, as loan and bond contracts treat financial misreporting (most notably, restatements and AAERs) as events 
of default (Li et al. 2015) and given the common use of cross-default or cross-acceleration provisions in loan and bond 
contracts (Beatty et al. 2012; Li et al. 2015), a deterioration of a firm’s accounting quality could lead to a debt 
renegotiation during which creditor coordination is important. We expect this contracting channel to strengthen the 
relation between accounting quality and debt concentration that we predict. An untabulated analysis also shows that 
the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration is robust to controlling for covenant violations. 
8 For example, the class “unsecured creditors” could comprise unsecured bonds, drawn credit lines, and term loans. 
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higher quality accounting information reduces information acquisition and processing costs and 
thus incentivizes buyers to enter the bidding process for the bankrupt firm’s assets, which in turn 
leads to higher liquidation values (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996).  
The above arguments suggest that high accounting quality reduces the risk of creditor 
coordination failure, thus making liquidations less likely, and increases liquidation values, thus 
making liquidations less inefficient (i.e., less costly) (e.g., Ayotte and Skeel 2013; Bolton and 
Scharfstein 1996; Senbet and Wang 2012; Wruck 1990). Consequently, when accounting quality 
is higher, a more dispersed debt structure is needed to make a credible liquidation threat and 
thereby deter strategic defaults. At the same time, higher accounting quality makes a dispersed 
debt structure less costly and therefore increases the borrower’s willingness to choose higher debt 
dispersion. Taken together, we thus predict that firms with higher accounting quality have more 
dispersed (i.e., less concentrated) debt structures.    
Note that this prediction does not necessarily require that firms have debt concentration 
explicitly in mind when choosing their debt structures. Consider, for example, a firm that tries to 
minimize its cost of debt without explicitly thinking about debt concentration. Because investors 
in the debt market price financial distress costs (e.g., Hoshi et al. 1990; Gertner and Scharfstein 
1991; Giammarino 1989; Wruck 1990), they incorporate the risk of creditor coordination failure 
and low liquidation values due to low accounting quality. In that case, if the firm has low 
accounting quality, it can achieve the lowest cost of debt with a more concentrated debt structure 
(relative to a firm with higher accounting quality, whose cost of debt is minimized with a relatively 
less concentrated debt structure). Hence, if firms choose among different debt financing 
arrangements by selecting the arrangement that yields the lowest cost of debt, then firms with 
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lower accounting quality will tend to select higher debt concentration than firms with higher 
accounting quality (possibly without even knowing this). Importantly, however, the resulting 
relation between accounting quality and debt concentration is ultimately still due to the fact that 
the value maximizing debt structure is less concentrated for firms with higher accounting quality. 9 
III. SAMPLE, VARIABLE MEASUREMENT, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Data Sources and Sample Selection 
We follow Colla et al. (2013) and obtain firm-level debt structure data from Capital IQ. Other 
firm characteristics are from COMPUSTAT. Capital IQ decomposes each firm’s total debt into 
seven mutually exclusive debt types: commercial paper, drawn credit lines, term loans, senior 
bonds and notes, subordinated bonds and notes, capital leases, and other debt. In line with Colla et 
al. (2013), we restrict our sample to firms listed on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE and further 
exclude utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4900 to 4949 and 6000 to 6999, respectively). We 
also drop observations with zero, missing, or apparently incorrect values of debt and total assets, 
such as observations for which the value of debt exceeds that of total assets. Further, we drop 
observations for which the difference between the firm’s total debt as reported in COMPUSTAT 
and the aggregated debt as reported in Capital IQ exceeds 10 percent of the former. 
We obtain information on material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting 
under Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as well as on accounting restatements from 
the Audit Analytics database.10 We hand-collect the announcement dates of AAERs from the 
                                                             
9 Note here the similarity to classical capital structure theory: Choosing the optimal capital structure corresponds to 
minimizing the cost of capital, and minimizing the cost of capital corresponds to choosing the optimal capital structure. 
10 We focus on ICW disclosures under Section 302 instead of under Section 404, which imposes ICW reporting 
requirements on external auditors, because prior studies suggest that the former substantially better reflect firms’ 
accounting quality than the latter (see Dechow et al. 2010 for a summary). Our main results, however, are robust to 
including ICW disclosures under both Sections 302 and 404. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532386
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
SEC’s website and obtain from COMPUSTAT whether a Big 4 auditor audits the firm. As SOX 
only became effective in July 2002, information on material internal control weaknesses is not 
available from Audit Analytics prior to August 2002.11 Consequently, we only keep observations 
from 2003 onward. Further, because we want to examine the relation between firms’ accounting 
quality and subsequent debt structure choices, we drop debt structure observations if information 
on the firm’s accounting quality in the previous year is not available. 12  We also remove 
observations for which any of the control variables required for our analysis are missing. The final 
sample consists of 2,835 firms and 15,392 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2017.  
Measurement of Debt Concentration 
We measure the concentration in a firm’s debt structure in two ways.13 First, we follow Colla 
et al. (2013) and compute the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) across the different 
types of debt used by the firm. Specifically, we calculate for firm i at the end of year t: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�2 + �𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�2 + �𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�2 + �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �2 + �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �2 + �𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�2 + �𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �2 ,    (1) 
where CP, DC, TL, SBN, SUB, CL, and Other denote the amounts of the seven types of debt 
recorded in Capital IQ: commercial paper, drawn credit lines, term loans, senior bonds and notes, 
subordinated bonds and notes, capital leases, and other debt. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 denotes the total amount of debt. 
We then normalize 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 to obtain: 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 1 7⁄ ) (1 − 1 7⁄ )⁄ .                                                               (2) 
By construction, 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ranges between zero and one. It is equal to zero if a firm uses all seven 
                                                             
11 Before SOX, firms were required to disclose deficiencies in internal controls only if changing auditors (Krishnan 
2005; Doyle et al. 2007). 
12 Our results are robust to requiring that data on firms’ accounting quality is available for at least three previous years. 
13 Untabulated analyses confirm that our findings are robust to several alternative measures of debt concentration, 
such as an indicator equal to one if any debt type individually accounts for more than 90 percent of the total debt.    
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types of debt in equal proportion (corresponding to minimum debt concentration). It is equal to 
one if a firm uses only a single type of debt (corresponding to maximum debt concentration).  
Second, we measure debt concentration with the number of different debt types in a firm’s 
debt structure (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). When doing so, we distinguish between the seven types of 
debt described above, so that NUM DEBT TYPES ranges from one to seven, with a higher value 
corresponding to a less concentrated debt structure. To focus on debt types with economically 
significant amounts, we count only types that make up at least 5 percent of the firm’s total debt.14  
The main difference between the two debt concentration measures is that, unlike NUM DEBT 
TYPES, HHI reflects not only the number of debt types but also the percentages of total debt that 
they account for. This is relevant because the distribution of fractional ownership is likely to play 
a role even for a fixed number of debt types. First, a reorganization plan in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
can only be confirmed by the court if it has been accepted by at least one class of impaired 
creditors, and a class is deemed to have accepted a plan if it has been accepted by creditors holding 
at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the claims in the class.15 Hence, 
because a class of claims (e.g., unsecured creditors) can comprise multiple debt types (e.g., 
unsecured bonds, drawn credit lines, and term loans), the distribution of fractional ownership 
accounted for by the different types plays a role. Second, if debt concentration increases because 
one debt type makes up a larger fraction of the total debt (say 90 percent) whereas the remaining 
debt types account only for very small fractions, then it is cheaper for the dominant creditor to buy 
out the remaining types or compensate their owners for any losses, which facilitates coordination. 
                                                             
14 Untabulated analyses confirm that this 5 percent cut-off is not critical and that counting debt types that make up at 
least 3 percent or 1 percent of the firm’s total debt (or simply counting all types) generally does not affect our results. 
15 https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics 
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A possible concern about measuring debt concentration with the HHI across different types 
of debt (or the number of different types) is that this only captures the concentration across types 
but not the concentration or number of creditors within each type. This is relevant because creditor 
coordination costs can be also related to the concentration or number of creditors within debt types, 
and higher accounting quality may also facilitate within-debt-type coordination. However, as we 
explain in Section II, lower debt concentration in the sense of using multiple debt types at the same 
time is likely to increase creditor coordination costs beyond the costs of within-debt-type 
coordination. Further, as we show in Section V (Table 6), our findings continue to hold when we 
control for firms’ reliance on public debt, which has a low degree of within-type concentration.  
Measurement of Accounting Quality  
In the conceptual framework that provides the theoretical basis for our study, when choosing 
their debt structure, borrowers know that creditors take accounting quality and its effect on creditor 
coordination costs and liquidation values into account. What matters, therefore, are creditors’ 
beliefs about accounting quality (i.e., perceived accounting quality, not necessarily “actual” 
accounting quality).16  We thus rely on observable indicators of (low) accounting quality: ICWs, 
accounting restatements, AAERs, and firms’ reliance on small auditors. Specifically, we use these 
indicators to construct an index of accounting quality (ACCOUNTING QUALITY). Our use of the 
different indicators is based on the extensive literature on accounting quality and is supported by 
Dechow et al.’s (2010) comprehensive review thereof, which identifies ICWs, restatements, and 
AAERs as common measures of accounting quality and emphasizes that auditors are an important 
                                                             
16 For example, it could be that a firm’s accounting quality is low during a particular year but that this remains 
unknown for some time and becomes known to creditors only later (e.g., through an accounting restatement or AAER).  
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determinant of accounting quality.17   
A material ICW indicates a deficiency in internal controls over financial reporting and thus 
low reliability of the firm’s accounting information (e.g., Beneish et al. 2008; Hammersley et al.  
2008; Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman 2011; Kim et al. 2011). Accounting restatements are 
often linked to aggressive accounting and misreporting and perceived negatively by both equity 
and debt holders (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991; Palmrose et al. 2004; Burns and Kedia 2006; 
Efendi et al. 2007; Graham et al. 2008). AAERs indicate earnings manipulation and thus exemplify 
low accounting quality (Feroz et al. 1991; Dechow et al. 1996; Karpoff et al. 2008a,b). Finally, the 
auditing process plays a crucial role in ensuring the credibility of financial reports (DeFond and 
Zhang 2014), and firms’ reliance on small auditors (e.g., non-Big 4 auditing firms) is typically 
associated with lower accounting quality (Dechow et al. 2010; Lennox and Pittman 2010; Ball et 
al. 2012; DeFond and Zhang 2014; DeFond et al. 2016).    
We construct the accounting quality index as follows: 
ACCOUTING QUALITYi,t-3,t-1 
= 4 – ICWi,t-3,t-1 – RESTATEMENTi,t-3,t-1 – AAERi,t-3,t-1 – SMALL AUDITORi,t-3,t-1,       (3) 
where ICWi,t-3,t-1, RESTATEMENTi,t-3,t-1, AAERi,t-3,t-1, and SMALL AUDITORi,t-3,t-1 are indicators 
equal to one if firm i has experienced a material ICW, a restatement, or an AAER, or is audited by 
a non-Big 4 auditor in any of the previous three years (i.e., years t-3, t-2, or t-1). The index thus 
ranges from zero to four, and higher values correspond to higher accounting quality.18 We consider 
                                                             
17 We do not include measures of accruals quality when constructing the index because discretionary accruals are not 
observed directly but must be estimated. However, as an untabulated robustness test, we add to the index a measure 
of accrual quality based on Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model, adjusted as in McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. 
(2005). Our inference that accounting quality is significantly and negatively related to debt concentration continues to 
hold.  
18 In untabulated tests, we consider five alternative ways to construct the index of firms’ accounting quality. First, we 
use the first principle component of ICW, RESTATEMENT, AAER, and SMALL AUDITOR as a composite measure of 
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accounting irregularity events and auditor size during a three-year window since debt structure 
adjustments following accounting quality changes cannot necessarily be performed immediately, 
as issuing and retiring debt securities takes time. Another reason is that prior work suggests that 
lenders are likely to view indications of low accounting quality as having long-lasting effects, even 
after the underlying problems have been addressed (Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman 2011).   
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics.19 The average values of HHI and NUM DEBT TYPES 
are 0.74 and 1.71. To put the average HHI in perspective, consider a firm that relies on two types 
of debt. In that case, a debt HHI of 0.74 corresponds to one debt type accounting for 87 percent 
and the other for 13 percent of total debt. The average within-firm standard deviations 
(untabulated) of HHI and NUM DEBT TYPES are 0.158 and 0.475, indicating that the firms’ debt 
concentration varies over time. The two debt concentration measures are also highly correlated: 
The Pearson correlation is -0.88 (untabulated).20 The average value of ACCOUNTING QUALITY 
is 3.37. This high average value reflects the fact that ICWs, restatements, AAERs, and being 
audited by a non-Big 4 auditor are rather infrequent events. Nonetheless, there is significant 
within-firm variation: 62 percent of the firms have an accounting quality index that changes during 
the sample period (untabulated).  
Table 1 also shows that the sample firms tend to be relatively large, as evidenced by their 
mean market value of equity of almost $4 billion. The mean market-to-book ratio is 1.9, the mean 
profitability is 7 percent, the mean tangibility ratio is 26 percent, the mean cash flow volatility is 
                                                             
accounting quality. Second, we construct four alternative indices, each based on only three of the four indicators ICW, 
RESTATEMENT, AAER, and SMALL AUDITOR. Our results are robust to using these alternative measures. 
19 All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Appendix A provides detailed definitions. 
20 The average within-firm correlation between HHI and NUM DEBT TYPES is -0.85 (untabulated). 
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7 percent, and the mean leverage ratio is 24 percent. About one third of the firms pay dividends, 
and 65 percent are unrated. The average age of the firms is ten years, defined as the number of 
years since their first appearance in COMPUSTAT. The average corporate governance index of 
Gompers et al. (2003) is nine,21 and the average number of business segments in which the firms 
operate is 2.74. The mean z-score (Altman 1968) is 0.70, the mean asset growth is 9 percent, and 
the mean daily return volatility is 3 percent. The average restructuring charges amount to 1 percent 
of the firms’ market capitalization, 26 percent of the observations pertain to years in which the 
firms raise new long-term debt and equity in excess of 20 percent of total assets, and an auditor 
resignation characterizes 1 percent of the observations. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Accounting Quality and Debt Concentration 
We now examine the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration by 
estimating the following model: 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇  𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−3,𝑖𝑖−1                                                       + 𝛼𝛼3𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂  𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1   +  𝛼𝛼4𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑄𝑄 𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1  
                                                                  + 𝛼𝛼5𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 + 𝛼𝛼6𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒  𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 .      (4)  
DEBT CONCENTRATION is one of the two measures of debt concentration: HHI or NUM DEBT 
TYPES. We estimate a Tobit model (censored at zero and one) for HHI and a Poisson model for 
NUM DEBT TYPES. The independent variable of interest is ACCOUNTING QUALITY.  
Colla et al. (2013) suggest that, in addition to creditor coordination costs, debt concentration 
                                                             
21 The sample average of the indicator G-INDEX MISSING reveals that information on the corporate governance index 
is not available for 92 percent of the observations. We replace these missing values with the industry median of the 
G-index. 
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may be also affected by lenders’ information collection and monitoring costs as well as by firms’ 
access to debt capital. We therefore follow Colla et al. (2013) and control for lenders’ information 
collection and monitoring costs with research and development expenditures (R&D) and for firms’ 
access to different segments of the debt market with an indicator reflecting whether the firms are 
rated or not (UNRATED). In addition, we control for other characteristics related to firms’ debt 
structures, including firm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), profitability 
(PROFITIBILITY), asset tangibility (TANGIBILITY), cash flow volatility (CF VOL), leverage 
(LEVERAGE), and an indicator reflecting whether or not the firms pay dividends (DIVIDEND). 
An important challenge is that firms’ accounting quality is not randomly assigned. To 
mitigate endogeneity concerns, we thus follow prior research and control for both firm and year 
fixed effects (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Valta 2012; Christensen et al. 2016). The firm 
fixed effects absorb all time-invariant differences between the firms. The year fixed effects absorb 
all time-varying factors that are common to all firms in a given year (e.g., macroeconomic 
conditions). In addition, we also control for the time-varying determinants of accounting quality 
suggested by prior research. 22  Specifically, we control for firm age (LN(FIRM AGE)), the 
corporate governance index of Gompers et al. (2003) (G-INDEX), an indicator equal to one if the 
governance index is missing (G-INDEX MISSING), the number of business segments 
(LN(SEGMENTS)), Altman’s (1968) z-score (Z-SCORE), asset growth (ASSET GROWTH), 
aggregate restructuring charges (RESTRUCTURE), an indicator for firms that raise significant 
amounts of debt and equity (DEBT AND EQUITY FUNDS RAISED), and an indicator for auditor 
resignation (AUDITOR RESIGNATION). Finally, we cluster all standard errors at the firm level. 
                                                             
22 See Willenborg (1999), Weber and Willenborg (2003), Doyle et al. (2007), Efendi et al. (2007), Chang et al. (2009), 
Kim et al. (2011), and Cheng et al. (2013). 
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Table 2 presents the results.23 To facilitate interpretation, we report average marginal effects. 
In column 1, we estimate a Tobit model (censored at zero and one) for HHI. The estimated effect 
of ACCOUNTING QUALITY is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. This is consistent 
with our prediction that firms with higher accounting quality have less concentrated debt 
structures. Specifically, the estimate implies that an increase in ACCOUNTING QUALITY by one 
notch is associated with a decrease in HHI by 0.01, which corresponds to a decrease by 6.3 percent 
(=|-0.010/0.158|) of the average within-firm standard deviation of HHI (0.158). Hence, while small 
in absolute terms, the implied change in HHI is noticeable relative to the “typical” change that we 
observe in the data. For comparison, a one standard deviation change in TANGIBILITY (SIZE) 
implies a change in HHI by 19.9 (16.7) percent of the average within-firm standard deviation.  
We next address the potential concern that the firm fixed effects in model (4) may cause an 
incidental parameters problem. First, note that there is no such problem in a Poisson model 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Second, Greene (2004) shows that the coefficient estimates in a fixed 
effects Tobit model (henceforth FE Tobit) are virtually unaffected by the incidental parameters 
problem. Nonetheless, we complement our analysis by estimating a Tobit model with correlated 
random effects (henceforth CRE Tobit), censored at zero and one (Wooldridge 2010):  
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−3,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂  𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 
𝛼𝛼4𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑄𝑄 𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖,                                   (5) 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  is a time-invariant, unobserved firm effect that may be correlated with the other 
covariates (Wooldridge 2002, p. 540-542). Column 2 of Table 2 presents the results. We continue 
                                                             
23 The values of R-squared for the Tobit and Poisson models in the paper are the squared correlation coefficients 
between predicted and observed outcomes (Wooldridge 2002, p. 529). We do not report the pseudo R-squared as it 
can be negative or larger than one in models with mixed continuous/discrete distributions (such as Tobit models). 
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to find that the estimated average marginal effect of ACCOUNTING QUALITY is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Last, going back to model (4), we estimate a Poisson model for NUM DEBT TYPES. Column 
3 shows that the estimated effect of ACCOUNTING QUALITY is positive (0.027) and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. This is consistent with our prediction that firms with higher 
accounting quality rely on more debt types. The estimate implies that a one-notch increase in the 
accounting quality index is associated with an increase in the number of debt types by 0.027, 
corresponding to 5.7 percent (= 0.027/0.475) of the average within-firm standard deviation of 
NUM DEBT TYPES (0.475). Hence, while small in absolute terms, the implied increase is 
noticeable in relative terms. For comparison, a one standard deviation change in TANGIBILITY 
(SIZE) implies a change in NUM DEBT TYPES by 25.8 (22.7) percent of the average within-firm 
standard deviation.24 Regarding the estimated effect of the control variables, we find that, in all 
specifications, debt concentration decreases with SIZE, TANGIBILITY, LEVERAGE, LN(FIRM 
AGE), LN(SEGMENTS), and ASSET GROWTH and increases with MTB.25, 26  
Cross-sectional Variation in the Relation between Accounting Quality and Debt 
Concentration: The Role of Default Risk and Liquidation Value   
In this section, we provide further support to the proposition that creditor coordination costs 
                                                             
24 It is also worth noting that NUM DEBT TYPES is a discrete variable, so that an average increase of 0.027 implies 
that some firms do not increase the number of types, whereas others increase it by at least one. Given that NUM DEBT 
TYPES is equal to one (two) for 47 (38) percent of the observations in our sample, an average increase of 0.027 thus 
implies that while the relative increase is zero for those firms that do not adjust the number of debt types, the increase 
is very large for those firms that do (e.g., 100 percent, for an increase from one debt type to two). 
25 Note that while Colla et al. (2013) report significant coefficients on most firm-level variables, the lack of statistical 
significance in our specification is due to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. When we replace the firm fixed effects 
with industry fixed effects, we find a significant relation between HHI and the majority of firm-level controls as in 
Colla et al. (2013) (untabulated). 
26 Untabulated tests show that our results are robust to using OLS models or not controlling for LEVERAGE, as well 
as to different ways of controlling for size (e.g., using dummies for size deciles or adding size squared). 
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play an important role for the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration. First, 
we expect the relation to be more pronounced for firms with higher default risk. The intuition is 
as follows. When the probability of default is higher, lenders and firms anticipate that creditor 
coordination is required with a higher likelihood and accounting quality thus more important. 
Second, we expect the relation to be stronger when a firm’s liquidation value is low because, in 
that case, creditor coordination in order to avoid liquidation is more important.  
Table 3 presents tests of these predictions. In Panel A, we compare the relation between 
accounting quality and debt concentration across sample partitions based on the firms’ credit 
ratings. The estimated average marginal effect of ACCOUNTING QUALITY on HHI is negative 
and significant for firms with a highly speculative grade credit rating (B+ or worse) and 
insignificant for firms with a better rating. The estimated effects for firms with a highly speculative 
grade rating are also significantly stronger than those for firms with better ratings. In terms of 
economic magnitude, the estimates for firms with a highly speculative grade rating imply that an 
increase in ACCOUNTING QUALITY by one notch is associated with a decrease in HHI by 19.6 
percent (FE Tobit) to 22.8 percent (CRE Tobit), relative to the average within-firm standard 
deviation of HHI. 
Consistent with the above result, the estimated effect of ACCOUNTING QUALITY on NUM 
DEBT TYPES is positive and statistically significant for firms with a highly speculative grade 
credit rating. It implies that an increase in the accounting quality index by one notch is associated 
with an increase in the number of debt types by 19.8 percent of the average within-firm standard 
deviation. In contrast, the estimate is close to zero and not statistically significant for firms with a 
better rating. The estimated effect for firms with a highly speculative grade credit rating is also 
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significantly larger than the estimate for firms with better credit ratings.  
In Panel B, we partition the sample based on firms’ cash flow volatility, another proxy for 
default risk (e.g., Titman and Wessels 1988). Specifically, we compute each firm’s cash flow 
volatility during the twelve quarters preceding the year in which we measure debt concentration 
and then classify firms whose cash flow volatility falls into the top tercile of the sample distribution 
as having high cash flow volatility and otherwise as having low cash flow volatility. In the sample 
of firms with high cash flow volatility, the estimated effect of ACCOUNTING QUALITY on HHI 
(NUM DEBT TYPES) is negative (positive) and significant. The estimates imply that an increase 
in ACCOUNTING QUALITY by one notch is associated with a decrease in HHI by 10.1 percent 
(CRE Tobit) to 12.0 percent (FE Tobit) and an increase in NUM DEBT TYPES by 14.1 percent of 
the respective average within-firm standard deviations. In contrast, the estimated effects for firms 
with low cash flow volatility are statistically insignificant for NUM DEBT TYPES and in the FE 
Tobit model for HHI and only marginally significant in the CRE Tobit model for HHI. Moreover, 
the estimated effects in the sample of firms with high cash flow volatility are significantly stronger. 
In Panel C, we partition the sample based on the firms’ z-scores (Altman 1968): We classify 
z-scores in the top tercile of the distribution as high, otherwise as low. Consistent with Panels A 
and B, we find significant effects of ACCOUNTING QUALITY on HHI and NUM DEBT TYPES 
for firms with low but not with high z-scores. Further, the estimated effects for firms with low z-
scores are significantly stronger, except for the analysis of NUM DEBT TYPES. The estimates for 
firms with low z-scores imply that an increase in ACCOUNTING QUALITY by one notch is 
associated with a decrease in HHI by 11.4 percent and an increase in the number of debt types by 
8.4 percent of the average within-firm standard deviations of HHI and NUM DEBT TYPES. 
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Finally, in Panel D, we partition the sample based on the firms’ liquidation values, which we 
estimate following Berger et al. (1996).27 Specifically, we classify firms with liquidation values in 
the bottom tercile of the sample distribution as having low liquidation values and otherwise as 
having high liquidation values. As predicted, for firms with low liquidation values, we find a 
statistically significant relation between accounting quality and debt concentration – but not for 
firms with high liquidation values, except in the CRE Tobit model for HHI, where the estimate is 
small in magnitude but marginally significant. The estimated effects in the sample of firms with 
low liquidation values are also significantly stronger, except in the FE Tobit model for HHI. In 
terms of economic magnitude, the estimates for the sample of firms with low liquidation values 
imply that an increase in ACCOUNTING QUALITY by one notch is associated with a decrease in 
HHI by 10.8 percent and an increase in the number of debt types by 11.6 percent of the respective 
average within-firm standard deviations of HHI and NUM DEBT TYPES. 
V. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES 
Changes Analysis 
In our primary analysis (Table 2), we rely on firm fixed effects (in the FE Tobit and Poisson 
models) and correlated random effects (in the CRE Tobit model) to control for unobservable, time-
invariant differences between firms. An alternative approach to remove the unobserved effects is 
to difference the data and regress year-on-year changes in debt concentration on year-on-year 
changes in accounting quality and control variables (Wooldridge 2002).  
Table 4 presents the results of such a changes analysis. Estimates of the relation between 
changes in accounting quality (ΔACCOUNTING QUALITY) and changes in the debt HHI (ΔHHI) 
                                                             
27 Specifically, the liquidation value of a firm’s assets is calculated as (cash + 0.72×receivables + 0.55×inventory + 
0.54×fixed assets – payables) / total assets. 
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are shown in column 1. Column 2 pertains to changes in the number of debt types (ΔNUM DEBT 
TYPES). We present OLS estimates because year-on-year changes in debt concentration (ΔHHI 
and ΔNUM DEBT TYPES) can be negative. 28 We include year fixed effects and cluster the 
standard errors by firm, as before. Column 1, where ΔHHI is the dependent variable, shows a 
negative coefficient estimate on ΔACCOUNTING QUALITY that is statistically significant at the 
1 percent level: Increases in accounting quality are significantly related to decreases in firms’ debt 
HHI. Column 2 shows a positive and significant (at the 1 percent level) relation between 
ΔACCOUNTING QUALITY and ΔNUM DEBT TYPES. That is, increases in accounting quality are 
significantly related to increases in the number of debt types, corroborating our primary findings.  
Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
A potential concern is that our estimations may suffer from functional form misspecification. 
Observations with different values of ACCOUNTING QUALITY may also differ along other 
dimensions, which may explain differences in debt concentration. Our primary analysis relies on 
the assumption that the relevant differences are captured by a linear combination of the control 
variables and fixed effects. If this assumption fails, i.e., if the functional form of the regressions is 
misspecified, then any uncaptured differences between observations become part of the error term. 
This, in turn, can create an endogeneity problem if these differences are correlated with both 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY and HHI or NUM DEBT TYPES.  
Propensity score matching (PSM) can help mitigate this concern by restricting the regression 
sample to observations that differ in terms of treatment status but are otherwise very similar 
                                                             
28 The number of observations in this estimation is smaller than in our primary analysis because differencing the data 
leads to a loss of observations whenever information on the prior year is not available (e.g., for the first year in our 
sample). Untabulated analyses reveal that the results are the same if instead of OLS we rely on a Tobit model censored 
at -1 and 1 to estimate the relation between ΔACCOUNTING QUALITY and ΔHHI.  
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(Shipman et al. 2017). A complication is that our treatment of interest (ACCOUNTING QUALITY) 
ranges from zero to four. A classical PSM procedure, which relies on a binary treatment, is 
therefore not applicable.29 However, we can exploit the fact that propensity score matching can be 
generalized to allow for multi-valued treatments (Joffe and Rosenbaum 1999; Imbens 2000). 
In analogy to a classical PSM analysis, we start by estimating the following Poisson model,  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−3,𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂  𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1                           + 𝛼𝛼3𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑄𝑄 𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑄𝑄 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−3,𝑖𝑖−1, (7) 
and then compute the predicted value of ACCOUNTING QUALITY for all observations in our 
sample. Thereafter, in analogy to matching on the predicted value of the treatment variable (i.e., 
matching on the propensity score) in a classical PSM analysis, we use the predicted value of 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY to match each observation with a control observation that has a different 
realized value of ACCOUNTING QUALITY (i.e., an observation with a very similar propensity 
score but a different treatment value). We require exact matches in terms of two-digit SIC code 
and year and impose a maximum caliper distance of 0.003. For example, an observation with 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY equal to three (say “observation A”) is matched to a control observation 
with the same two-digit SIC code and from the same year, whose realized value of ACCOUNTING 
QUALITY differs from three but whose predicted value of ACCOUNTING QUALITY differs by 
less than 0.003 from observation A’s predicted value of ACCOUNTING QUALITY. As in a 
classical PSM analysis, the purpose of this matching procedure is to construct a sample of 
observations that are very similar in terms of covariates (here: Debt Structure Determinants, 
                                                             
29 Note that dichotomizing the accounting quality index into a 0/1 indicator (e.g., by defining an indicator equal to one 
if ACCOUNTING QUALITY is larger than the sample median, zero otherwise) would greatly diminish the power of 
the tests and thus increase the likelihood of a false negative (Shipman et al. 2017). 
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Accounting Quality Determinants, Industry, and Year) but differ in terms of treatment (here: 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY).30 Next, as in a classical PSM analysis, we estimate our regressions of 
interest (i.e., regressions of HHI and NUM DEBT TYPES on ACCOUNTING QUALITY, control 
variables, and fixed effects) using the matched sample. 
Table 5 presents the results. Panel A shows the results from the first stage Poisson model. 
We find a significant positive relation between ACCOUNTING QUALITY and SIZE, 
PROFITABILITY, DIVIDEND, R&D, LEVERAGE, and G-INDEX MISSING and a significant 
negative relation between ACCOUNTING QUALITY and MTB, LN(SEGMENTS), RETURN VOL, 
and AUDITOR RESIGNATION. Panel B shows the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of 
the different covariates (Debt Structure Determinants and Accounting Quality Determinants) on 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY as well as firm and year fixed effects. In analogy to a “covariate balance 
test” in a classical PSM analysis, the purpose of these regressions is to assess the conditional 
correlation between the covariates and the treatment variable (ACCOUNTING QUALITY) in the 
matched sample. The coefficient estimates on ACCOUNTING QUALITY are all insignificant 
except in the regression relating ACCOUNTING QUALITY to LN(SEGMENTS), where the 
estimate is significant at the 10 percent level. Note however, that under the null-hypothesis that 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY is unrelated to the covariates in the matched sample, the probability of 
finding at least one significant coefficient when estimating 19 independent regressions is 86 
percent (= 1 – 0.919). As such, a single significant coefficient does not provide much evidence that 
“covariate balance” is violated. Further, to control for any remaining differences between 
observations with different values of accounting quality, we follow the suggestion by Shipman et 
                                                             
30 To avoid repeated weighting of control observations that are the most closely comparable match for multiple 
treatment observations, we include such control observations only once in the matched sample. 
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al. (2017) and include Debt Structure Determinants and Accounting Quality Determinants when 
estimating the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration.  
Panel C shows the results of regressing HHI and NUM DEBT TYPES on ACCOUNTING 
QUALITY and covariates using the matched sample. All regressions are specified as in Table 2. 
The estimated effect of ACCOUNTING QUALITY is -0.020 (-0.018) and significant at the 5 (1) 
percent level in the FE Tobit (CRE Tobit) model using HHI to measure debt concentration. The 
estimated effect is 0.069 and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in the Poisson model for 
NUM DEBT TYPES. These findings corroborate the results of our primary tests. 
Controlling for Other Debt Structure Characteristics 
A firm’s accounting quality may be related to other dimensions of its debt structure (e.g., the 
firm’s reliance on public or senior debt, maturity concentration, or the use of debt with more 
covenants). A concern could thus be that these dimensions – rather than creditor coordination costs 
– are the reason for the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration that we find. 
To mitigate this concern, we re-estimate the relation between ACCOUNTING QUALITY and HHI 
and NUM DEBT TYPES after including different debt structure characteristics as additional 
controls. Specifically, we compute the percentage of public debt (commercial paper, senior bonds, 
and subordinated bonds), the percentage of senior debt, and the percentage of callable debt 
instruments in the firm’s total debt. We also compute the concentration of the debt’s maturity 
structure by classifying all outstanding debt instruments into five categories based on their 
remaining maturity – less than one year, one-to-three years, three-to-five years, five-to-ten years, 
and more than ten years – and computing the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for these 
maturity categories. In addition, we construct a firm-level covenant index by counting the number 
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of covenants that are specified in the firm’s outstanding loans and bonds.31 We then add these 
variables (PUBLIC DEBT, SENIOR DEBT, CALLABLE DEBT, HHI-MATURITY, and FIRM-
LEVEL COVENANTS) as additional controls to the regression specifications.  
Table 6 presents the results.32 We continue to find a positive relation between accounting 
quality and debt concentration. Indeed, the magnitudes of the estimated effects are very similar to 
those reported in Table 2. Specifically, the estimated effect of ACCOUNTING QUALITY on HHI 
is -0.009 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in both the FE Tobit and CRE Tobit 
models. The estimated effect of ACCOUNTING QUALITY on NUM DEBT TYPES is 0.030 and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These findings suggest that the relation between 
accounting quality and debt concentration that we document is unlikely to be driven by other debt 
structure characteristics. 
Of particular relevance is the finding that PUBLIC DEBT is positively (negatively) related 
to HHI (NUM DEBT TYPES), i.e., that firms’ use of public debt is associated with higher 
concentration across debt types. 33 This result is important because prior literature suggests a 
positive relation between accounting quality and the use of public debt (e.g., Bharath et al. 2008) 
and hence a negative relation with concentration within debt types (as public debt presumably has 
                                                             
31 If a given covenant is included in multiple loans or bonds, we count the covenant only once. In an untabulated 
analysis, we further confirm that our results are robust to controlling for covenant violations. 
32 The sample size drops to 12,522 observations because information on the maturity and seniority of the different 
debt instruments is not always available. 
33 While it may appear surprising at first that the use of public debt is associated with more debt concentration in the 
data, we note that the relation between PUBLIC DEBT and debt concentration could a priori be positive or negative 
and is ultimately an empirical question. To illustrate, consider an example with only two types of debt, public and 
private. In that case, the relation between the percentage of public debt and the debt HHI is negative if the percentage 
of public debt is between 0 percent and 50 percent but positive if the percentage of public debt is between 50 percent 
and 100 percent. That is, a greater reliance on public debt can increase or decrease debt concentration across debt 
types depending on how much public debt the borrower uses. Further, better access to public debt may allow borrowers 
to obtain larger amounts of debt financing from a single source (e.g., public bonds) rather than having to rely on 
multiple sources of private debt, which can only supply smaller amounts of debt each. This provides another possible 
explanation for our finding that PUBLIC DEBT is empirically associated with greater debt concentration. 
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a lower within-concentration than private debt). A priori, a concern could thus have been that firms 
with higher accounting quality use more public debt, and that this higher reliance on public debt 
in turn explains our finding of a negative relation between accounting quality and debt 
concentration. Table 6 shows that this is not the case: Firms’ use of public debt is actually 
associated with more concentration across debt types, not less. It follows that a higher reliance on 
public debt by firms with higher accounting quality cannot explain our results.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Motivated by the important role of accounting quality in facilitating creditor coordination 
and mitigating inefficiencies in the default resolution process, we examine whether firms with 
higher accounting quality have less concentrated debt structures. Using an index of accounting 
quality based on the occurrence of material ICWs, accounting restatements, SEC AAERs, and 
firms’ reliance on small auditors and measuring debt concentration with a normalized Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of debt type usage and with the number of debt types that firms use, we show 
that higher accounting quality is indeed associated with significantly less concentrated debt 
structures. We further show that the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration is 
stronger for firms with higher default risk and lower liquidation values, consistent with the idea 
that creditor coordination failure is a more important concern for these firms. 
 Our new perspective on the role of accounting quality in facilitating creditor coordination 
allows us to establish an important link between accounting quality and debt concentration, a first-
order aspect of firms’ capital structures. Our findings also enhance our understanding of the 
different ways through which accounting information affects debt markets and highlight its central 
role in helping distinct lenders coordinate their interests.   
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532386
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Altman, E. 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. Journal 
of Finance 23 (4): 589-609. 
Asquith, P., R. Gertner, and D. Scharfstein. 1994. Anatomy of financial distress: an examination of junk-
bond issuers. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (3): 625-658. 
Ayotte, K., and E. Morrison. 2009. Creditor control and conflict in Chapter 11. Journal of Legal Analysis 
1 (2): 511-551.  
Ayotte, K., and D. Skeel. 2013. Bankruptcy law as a liquidity provider. The University of Chicago Law 
Review 80 (4): 1557-1624. 
Ball, R., S. Jayaraman, and L. Shivakumar 2012. Audited financial reporting and voluntary disclosure as 
complements: A test of the Confirmation Hypothesis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53 (1-2): 
136-166. 
Ball, R., R. Bushman, and F. Vasvari. 2008. The debt-contracting value of accounting information and loan 
syndicate structure. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (2): 247-87. 
Beatty, A., S. Liao, and J. Weber. 2010. Financial reporting quality, private information, monitoring, and 
the lease-versus-buy decision. The Accounting Review 85 (4): 1215-1238. 
Beatty, A., S. Liao, and J. Weber. 2012. Evidence on the determinants and economic consequences of 
delegated monitoring. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53 (3): 555-576. 
Beneish, M., M. Billings, and L. Hodder. 2008. Internal control weaknesses and information uncertainty. 
The Accounting Review 83 (3): 665-703. 
Berger, P.G., E. Ofek, and I. Swary. 1996. Investor valuation of the abandonment option. Journal of 
Financial Economics 42 (2): 257-287. 
Berglöf, E., and E. von Thadden. 1994. Short-term versus long-term interests: capital structure with 
multiple investors. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (4): 1055-1084. 
Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan. 2003. Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial 
preferences. Journal of Political Economy 111 (5): 1043-1072. 
Bharath, S., J. Sunder, and S. Sunder. 2008. Accounting quality and debt contracting. The Accounting 
Review 83 (1): 1-28. 
Bolton, P., and D. Scharfstein. 1996. Optimal debt structure and the number of creditors. Journal of 
Political Economy 104 (1): 1-25. 
Bris, A., and I. Welch. 2005. The optimal concentration of creditors. Journal of Finance 60 (5): 2193-2212. 
Burns, N., and S. Kedia. 2006. The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting. Journal 
of Financial Economics 79 (1): 35-67. 
Cameron, C., and P. Trivedi. 2005. Microeconometrics: Methods and applications. Cambridge University 
Press: New York, NY. 
Chang, X., S. Dasgupta, and G. Hilary. 2009. The effect of auditor quality on financing decisions. The 
Accounting Review 84 (4): 1085-1117. 
Cheng, M., D. Dhaliwal, and Y. Zhang. 2013. Does investment efficiency improve after the disclosure of 
material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting? Journal of Accounting and Economics 
56 (1): 1-18.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532386
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
Christensen, H., L. Hail, and C. Leuz. 2016. Capital market effects of securities regulation: Prior conditions, 
implementation, and enforcement. Review of Financial Studies 29 (11): 2885-2924.  
Christensen, H., and V. Nikolaev. 2012. Capital versus performance covenants in debt contracts. Journal 
of Accounting Research 50 (1): 75-116. 
Colla, P., F. Ippolito, and K. Li.  2013. Debt specialization. Journal of Finance 68 (5): 2117-2141. 
Costello, A., and R. Wittenberg-Moerman. 2011. The impact of financial reporting quality on debt 
contracting: Evidence from internal control weakness reports. Journal of Accounting Research 49 (1): 
97-136. 
Dechow, P., and I. Dichev. 2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual estimation errors. 
The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 35-59.  
Dechow. P., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: an 
analysis of firms subject to enforcement action by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13 
(1): 1-36. 
Dechow, P., W. Ge, and C. Schrand. 2010. Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their 
determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 (2-3): 344-401. 
DeFond, M., D. Erkens, and J. Zhang. 2016. Do client characteristics really drive the big N audit quality 
effect? New evidence from propensity score matching. Management Science 63 (11): 3628-3649.  
DeFond, M., and J. Jiambalvo. 1991. Incidence and circumstances of accounting errors. The Accounting 
Review 66 (3): 643-655. 
DeFond, M., and J. Zhang. 2014. A review of archival auditing research. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 58 (2-3): 275-326. 
Detragiache, E., P. Garcella, and L. Guiso. 2000. Multiple versus single banking relationships: Theory and 
evidence. Journal of Finance 55 (3): 1133-1161.  
Dhaliwal, D., I. Khurana, and R. Pereira. 2011. Firm disclosure policy and the choice between private and 
public debt. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (1): 293-330. 
Diamond, D., 1991a. Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (3): 
709-737. 
Diamond, D. 1991b. Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt. 
Journal of Political Economy 99 (4): 689-721. 
Diamond, D. 1993. Seniority and maturity of debt contracts. Journal of Financial Economics 33 (3): 341-
368. 
Doyle, J., W. Ge, and S. McVay. 2007. Accruals quality and internal control over financial reporting. The 
Accounting Review 82 (5): 1141-1170. 
Efendi, J., A. Srivastava, and E. Swanson. 2007. Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? 
The role of option compensation and other factors. Journal of Financial Economics 85 (3): 667-708. 
Feroz, E., K. Park, and V. Pastena. 1991. The financial and market effects of the SEC’s accounting and 
auditing enforcement releases. Journal of Accounting Research 29 (Supplement): 107-142. 
Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. Olsson, and K. Schipper. 2005. The market pricing of accruals quality. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 39 (2): 295-327.  
Gertner, R. and D. Scharfstein. 1991. A theory of workouts and the effects of reorganization law. Journal 
of Finance 46 (4): 1189-1222. 
Giammarino, R. 1989. The resolution of financial distress. Review of Financial Studies 2 (1): 25-47. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532386
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
Gompers, P., J. Ishii, and A. Metrick. 2003. Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 118 (1): 107-155. 
Graham, J., S. Li, and J. Qiu. 2008. Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting. Journal of Financial 
Economics 89 (1): 44-61.  
Greene, W. 2004. Fixed effects and bias due to the incidental parameters problem in the tobit model. 
Econometric Reviews 23 (2): 125-147. 
Hammersley, J., L. Myers, and C. Shakespeare. 2008. Market reactions to the disclosure of internal control 
weaknesses and to the characteristics of those weaknesses under section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act of 2002. Review of Accounting Studies 13 (1): 141-165. 
Hoshi, T., A. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein. 1990. The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress 
in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 27 (1): 67-88. 
Imbens, G. 2000. The role of the propensity score in estimating dose-response functions. Biometrika 87 (3): 
706-710. 
Ivashina, V., B. Iverson, D. Smith. 2016. The ownership and trading of debt claims in Chapter 11 
Restructurings. Journal of Financial Economics 119 (2): 316-335. 
Jensen, M., and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360. 
Joffe, M., and P. Rosenbaum. 1999. Invited commentary: Propensity scores. American Journal of 
Epidemiology 150 (4): 327-333. 
Karpoff, J., D. Lee, and G. Martin. 2008a. The consequences to managers for financial misrepresentation. 
Journal of Financial Economics 88 (2): 193-215.  
Karpoff, J., D. Lee, and G. Martin. 2008b. The cost to firms of cooking the books. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 43 (3): 581-611.  
Kim, J., B. Song, and L. Zhang. 2011. Internal control weakness and bank loan contracting: Evidence from 
SOX section 404 disclosures. The Accounting Review 86 (4): 1157-1188. 
Krishnan, J. 2005. Audit committee quality and internal control: an empirical analysis. The Accounting 
Review 80 (2): 649-675.  
Lennox, C. and J. Pittman. 2010. Big Five audits and accounting fraud. Contemporary Accounting Research 
27 (1): 209-247.  
Li, N., Y. Lou, and F. Vasvari. 2015. Default clauses in debt contracts. Review of Accounting Studies 20 
(4): 1596-1637.  
Lou, Y., and C. Otto. 2020. Debt heterogeneity and covenants. Management Science 66 (1): 70-92. 
McNichols, M. 2002. Discussion of the quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation 
errors. The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 61-69.  
Palmrose, Z., Richardson, V.J., Scholz, S., 2004. Determinants of market reactions to restatement       
announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37 (1), 59–89. 
Park, C. 2000. Monitoring and the structure of debt contracts. Journal of Finance 55 (5): 2157-95. 
Rajan, R. 1992. Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm’s-length debt. Journal of 
Finance 47 (4): 1367-1400. 
Rauh, J., and A. Sufi. 2010. Capital structure and debt structure. Review of Financial Studies 23 (12): 4242-
4280. 
Senbet, L., and T. Wang. 2012. Corporate financial distress and bankruptcy: A survey. Foundations and 
Trends in Finance 5 (4): 243-335. 
Tirole, J. 2006. The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532386
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
Shipman, J., Q. Swanquist, and R. Whited. 2017. Propensity Score Matching in Accounting Research. The 
Accounting Review 92 (1): 213-244. 
Titman, S., and R. Wessels. 1988. The determinants of capital structure choice. Journal of Finance 43 (1): 
1-19.  
Valta, P. 2012. Competition and the cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 105 (3): 661-682. 
Warner, J. 1977. Bankruptcy, absolute priority, and the pricing of risky debt claims. Journal of Financial 
Economics 4 (3): 239-276. 
Weber, J., and M. Willenborg. 2003. Do expert informational intermediaries add value? Evidence from 
auditors in microcap initial public offerings. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (4): 681-720. 
Weiss, L. 1990. Priority of claims and ex post re-contracting in bankruptcy. Journal of Financial Economics 
27 (2): 285-314. 
Willenborg, M. 1999. Empirical analysis of the economic demand for auditing in the initial public offering 
market. Journal of Accounting Research 37 (1): 225-238. 
Wooldridge, J. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.  
Wooldridge, J. 2010. Correlated random effects models with unbalanced panels. Working Paper, Michigan 
State University.  
Wruck, K. 1990. Financial distress, reorganization, and organizational efficiency. Journal of Financial 
Economics 27 (2): 419-444.  
Zhang, J. 2008. The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 45 (1): 27-54. 
Zhong, H. 2018. A dynamic model of optimal creditor dispersion. Working Paper. London School of 
Economics. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532386
 35 
 
 
Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable               Definition Data Source 
Debt Structure Measures 
HHI 
 
Normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index of debt concentration, computed as follows: First, we calculate the sum of the squared debt 
type ratios for firm i at the end of year t: 
 
Capital IQ 
 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�2 + �𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�2 + �𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�2 + �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �2 + �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �2 + �𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�2+ �𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �2 
  
 
where CP, DC, TL, SBN, SUB, CL, and Other refer to the amounts of the seven types of debt recorded in Capital IQ: commercial 
paper, drawn credit lines, term loans, senior bonds and notes, subordinated bonds and notes, capital leases, and other debt, 
respectively. TD is the total amount of debt. We then normalize SSit to obtain: 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 17)/(1− 17). 
   
NUM DEBT 
TYPES 
Number of different debt types in a firm’s debt structure. To focus on debt types with economically significant amounts, we count 
only types that make up at least 5 percent of the firm’s total debt. Capital IQ 
   
Other Debt Structure Characteristics 
 
  
PUBLIC DEBT Ratio of public debt (commercial paper, senior bonds, and subordinated bonds) to total debt. Capital IQ 
   
SENIOR DEBT Ratio of senior debt to total debt. Capital IQ 
 
CALLABLE 
DEBT  
Ratio of callable debt to total debt. Capital IQ 
   
HHI MATURITY Normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on the percentages of debt in different maturity categories.   Capital IQ 
FIRM-LEVEL 
COVENANTS Number of unique covenants in a firm’s outstanding loans and bonds. 
 
Dealscan & 
Mergent Fixed 
Income Securities 
Database  
Determinants of Firms’ Debt Structures 
 
 
  
SIZE Natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Compustat 
   
MTB Ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to total assets. Compustat 
   
PROFITABILITY Ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. Compustat 
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DIVIDEND Indicator equal to one if common stock dividends are positive, zero otherwise. Compustat 
   
TANGIBILITY Ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Compustat 
   
CF VOL Standard deviation of quarterly operating cash flows over the previous twelve quarters scaled by total assets.  Compustat 
   
R&D Ratio of research and development expense to total assets. If the value of research and development expense is missing, R&D is assigned a value of zero.  Compustat 
   
UNRATED Indicator equal to one if a firm is unrated, zero otherwise. Compustat  
   
LEVERAGE Ratio of the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilit ies to total assets. Compustat 
   
Accounting Quality Measure 
 
   
ACCOUNTING 
QUALITY 
4 – ICW – RESTATEMENT – AAER – SMALL AUDITOR, where ICW is an indicator equal to one if a firm reported a material internal 
control weakness under SOX Section 302 in any of the previous three years, RESTATEMENT is an indicator equal to one if a firm 
experienced an accounting restatement in any of the previous three years, SMALL AUDITOR is an indicator equal to one if a firm 
relied on a non-Big 4 auditor in any of the previous three years, and AAER is an indicator equal to one if a firm was mentioned in an 
SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release in any of the previous three years. All indicators are zero otherwise. 
Audit Analytics, 
Compustat, and SEC 
   
Determinants of Accounting Quality 
 
LN(FIRM AGE) Natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s first  appearance in Compustat. Compustat 
   
G-INDEX Corporate governance index based on Gompers et al. (2003) as reported in the Risk Metrics database. If the value of the index is missing in the Risk Metrics database, G-INDEX is assigned the industry median.  Risk Metrics 
   
G-INDEX 
MISSING 
Indicator equal to one if the Gompers et al. (2003) corporate governance index is missing in the Risk Metrics database, zero 
otherwise. Risk Metrics 
   
LN(SEGMENTS) Natural logarithm of the number of business segments. Compustat 
   
Z-SCORE 
Modified Altman’s (1968) z-score computed as (1.2×working capital+1.4× retained earnings+3.3×EBIT+0.999×sales)/total assets. 
Following Graham et al. (2008), we exclude the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of total debt from the 
computation because a similar term, MTB, enters our regression specifications as a separate control variable. 
 
Compustat 
ASSET GROWTH Change in the natural logarithm of total assets. Compustat 
   
RETURN VOL Standard deviation of daily stock returns. CRSP 
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RESTRUCTURE Aggregate restructuring charges in years t and t–1, scaled by the firm’s market capitalization at the end of year t. Compustat 
   
DEBT AND 
EQUITY FUNDS 
RAISED 
Indicator equal to one if the sum of new long-term debt and new equity exceeds 20 percent of total assets, zero otherwise. Compustat 
   
AUDITOR 
RESIGNATION Indicator equal to one if an auditor resigned, zero otherwise. Audit Analytics 
   
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532386
 38 
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for our main variables of interest based on our final sample, which consists of 
2,835 firms and 15,392 firm-year observations. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
  Mean P25 Median P75 SD N 
Debt Structure Measures       
HHI 0.74 0.48 0.82 1.00 0.26 15,392 
NUM DEBT TYPES 1.71 1.00 2.00 2.00 0.78 15,392 
       
Accounting Quality Measure       
ACCOUNTING QUALITY 3.37 3.00 4.00 4.00 0.82 15,392 
 
Determinants of Debt Structure 
      
MKT EQUITY ($MM) 3,896 137 552 2,123 11,519 15,392 
SIZE 6.32 4.92 6.31 7.66 2.03 15,392 
MTB 1.94 1.18 1.55 2.21 1.28 15,392 
PROFITABILITY 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.19 15,392 
DIVIDEND 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.47 15,392 
TANGIBILITY 0.26 0.08 0.18 0.38 0.23 15,392 
CF VOL 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.07 15,392 
R&D 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.11 15,392 
UNRATED 0.65 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.48 15,392 
LEVERAGE 0.24 0.09 0.21 0.34 0.19 15,392 
       
Determinants of Accounting Quality       
FIRM AGE 10.34 7.00 10.00 13.00 3.83 15,392 
LN(FIRM AGE) 2.27 1.95 2.30 2.56 0.37 15,392 
G-INDEX 9.04 8.00 9.00 10.00 1.01 15,392 
G-INDEX MISSING 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.27 15,392 
SEGMENTS 2.74 1.00 2.00 4.00 2.01 15,392 
LN(SEGMENTS) 0.74 0.00 0.69 1.39 0.73 15,392 
Z-SCORE 0.70 0.42 1.45 2.31 3.33 15,392 
ASSET GROWTH 0.09 -0.03 0.06 0.17 0.29 15,392 
RETURN VOL 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 15,392 
RESTRUCTURE 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 15,392 
DEBT AND EQUITY FUNDS RAISED 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 15,392 
AUDITOR RESIGNATION 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 15,392 
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Table 2: Accounting Quality and Debt Concentration 
This table shows estimates of the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration. ACCOUNTING 
QUALITY is the index of firms’ accounting quality. HHI is the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of debt 
concentration in firms’ debt structure, and NUM DEBT TYPES is the number of different debt types. Columns 1 
and 2 present the results from a firm fixed effects Tobit model (FE Tobit) and a correlated random effects Tobit 
model (CRE Tobit), both censored at zero and one, respectively. Column 3 presents the results from a Poisson 
model with firm fixed effects. All regressions include year fixed effects. The reported estimates are average 
marginal effects and corresponding z-statistics. The reported R-squared is the squared correlation coefficient 
between the predicted and observed value of the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered by firm in the 
FE Tobit and Poisson models. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Dependent Variable: HHI NUM DEBT TYPES 
  1 2 3 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.027** 
 (-2.64) (-3.60) (2.17) 
SIZE -0.013*** -0.012*** 0.053*** 
 (-2.73) (-3.66) (3.38)  
MTB 0.007** 0.007*** -0.022** 
 (2.07) (2.96) (-2.25) 
PROFITABILITY 0.031 0.027 -0.050 
 (0.98) (1.27) (-0.54) 
DIVIDEND  -0.002 -0.002  0.032 
 (-0.26) (-0.38) (0.93) 
TANGIBILITY -0.137*** -0.132*** 0.532*** 
 (-3.44) (-5.10) (4.25) 
CF VOL 0.066 0.069 -0.153 
 (0.94) (1.50) (-0.78)  
R&D  -0.027 -0.027 -0.088 
 (-0.39) (-0.60) (-0.49)  
UNRATED 0.015 0.016* -0.011 
 (1.22) (1.87) (-0.28) 
LEVERAGE -0.214*** -0.208*** 0.558*** 
 (-8.89) (-13.14)  (7.34) 
LN(FIRM AGE)  -0.117** -0.032** 0.285* 
 (-2.30)  (-2.27) (1.93) 
G-INDEX -0.000  -0.000 0.011 
 (-0.04) (-0.05) (1.37) 
G-INDEX MISSING 0.009  0.009  -0.038 
 (1.25) (1.43)  (-1.61)  
LN(SEGMENTS) -0.018** -0.018*** 0.058** 
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 (-2.44) (-3.68) (2.46) 
Z-SCORE 0.000 0.000  -0.002 
 (0.07) (0.17)  (-0.33)  
ASSET GROWTH -0.030***  -0.028*** 0.061*** 
 (-3.59)  (-4.26) (2.59) 
RETURN VOL 0.151  0.131 -0.264 
 (0.77) (0.83)  (-0.46)  
RESTRUCTURE 0.038 0.034 0.264 
 (0.60) (0.64) (1.29) 
DEBT AND EQUITY FUNDS RAISED 0.004 0.004 -0.010 
  (0.87) (0.97) (-0.72) 
AUDITOR RESIGNATION  -0.002 -0.003 -0.033 
  (-0.17) (-0.24) (-0.72) 
Model Specification FE Tobit CRE Tobit Poisson 
Firm & Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 15,392 15,392 15,392 
R-squared 0.579 0.131 0.572 
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Table 3: Variation in Firms’ Default Risk and Liquidation Value 
 
This table shows estimates of the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration for subsamples based on firms’ default risk and liquidation value. 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY is the index of firms’ accounting quality. HHI is the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of debt concentration in firms’ debt 
structure, and NUM DEBT TYPES is the number of different debt types. The sample partition in Panel A is based on firms’ credit rating, in Panel B on firms’ cash 
flow volatility, in Panel C on firms’ z-score, and in Panel D on firms’ liquidation value. In each panel, columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4 present the results 
from firm fixed effects Tobit models (FE Tobit) and correlated random effects Tobit models (CRE Tobit), both censored at zero and one, respectively. Columns 5 
and 6 present the results from Poisson models with firm fixed effects. All regressions include year fixed effects. The reported estimates are average marginal effects 
and corresponding z-statistics. The reported R-squared is the squared correlation coefficient between the predicted and observed value of the dependent variable. 
At the bottom of each panel, we report the p-values of one-sided tests of the null-hypothesis of equal marginal effects in the subsamples. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm in the FE Tobit and Poisson models. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The sample 
sizes in Panel A (828+4,613=5,441) and Panel D (5,078+10,154=15,232) are smaller than 15,392 because information on firms’ credit ratings and the data necessary 
to estimate firms’ liquidation value are not available for all observations. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Variation in Credit Ratings 
Dependent Variable: HHI                                             NUM DEBT TYPES 
         1         2        3        4        5         6 
  
Highly 
Speculative 
Grade 
Low Speculative/ 
Investment Grade 
Highly 
Speculative 
Grade 
Low Speculative/ 
Investment Grade 
Highly 
Speculative 
Grade 
Low Speculative/ 
Investment Grade 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY -0.031** -0.001 -0.036*** -0.002 0.094* -0.003 
  (-2.31)  (-0.15)  (-3.19) (-0.31)  (1.88) (-0.10) 
Model Specification FE Tobit FE Tobit CRE Tobit CRE Tobit Poisson Poisson 
Debt Structure Determinants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Accounting Quality Determinants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 828 4,613 828 4,613 828 4,613 
R-squared 0.736 0.606 0.194 0.138 0.731 0.573 
P-value for Marginal Effect Difference 0.026 0.003 0.046 
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Panel B:  Variation in Cash Flow Volatility 
Dependent Variable: HHI                                                                                         NUM DEBT TYPES 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  High CF VOL 
Low CF 
VOL 
High CF 
VOL 
Low CF 
VOL 
High CF 
VOL 
Low CF 
VOL 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY -0.019*** -0.007 -0.016*** -0.006* 0.067*** 0.016 
  (-2.86) (-1.37) (-3.20) (-1.86) (3.16) (0.99) 
Model Specification FE Tobit FE Tobit CRE Tobit CRE Tobit Poisson Poisson 
Debt Structure Determinants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Accounting Quality Determinants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 5,130 10,262 5,130 10,262 5,130 10,262 
R-squared 0.645 0.598 0.116 0.122 0.651 0.585 
P-value for Marginal Effect Difference 0.035 0.026 0.018 
 
 
Panel C:  Variation in Z-Score           
Dependent Variable: HHI       NUM DEBT TYPES 
           1          2        3        4      5        6 
  Low Z-Score High Z-Score Low Z-Score High Z-Score Low Z-Score High Z-Score 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY -0.018*** -0.006 -0.018*** -0.005 0.040** 0.016 
  (-2.81) (-1.16) (-3.88)  (-1.45) (1.97)  (1.02) 
Model Specification FE Tobit FE Tobit CRE Tobit CRE Tobit Poisson Poisson 
Debt Structure Determinants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Accounting Quality Determinants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 5,130 10,262 5,130 10,262 5,130 10,262 
R-squared 0.646 0.581 0.168 0.129 0.657 0.566 
P-value for Marginal Effect Difference 0.043 0.007 0.156 
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Panel D: Variation in Liquidation Value      
Dependent Variable: HHI NUM DEBT TYPES 
           1           2              3                 4               5             6 
  
Low 
Liquidation 
Value 
High 
Liquidation 
Value 
Low  
Liquidation  
Value 
High 
Liquidation 
Value 
Low 
Liquidation 
Value 
High 
Liquidation 
Value 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY -0.017** -0.006 -0.017***  -0.006* 0.055** 0.014 
  (-2.40)  (-1.40)  (-3.35) (-1.80) (2.38) (0.98) 
Model Specification FE Tobit FE Tobit CRE Tobit CRE Tobit Poisson Poisson 
Debt Structure Determinants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Accounting Quality Determinants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 5,078 10,154 5,078 10,154 5,078 10,154 
R-squared 0.607 0.612 0.119 0.131 0.593 0.619 
P-value for Marginal Effect Difference 0.151 0.076 0.084 
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Table 4: Changes Analysis 
 
This table shows estimates of the relation between year-on-year changes in accounting quality and year-on-year 
changes in debt concentration. ΔHHI is the change in the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of debt 
concentration in firms’ debt structure from year t-1 to year t, and ΔNUM DEBT TYPES is the change in the number 
of different debt types from year t-1 to year t. ΔACCOUNTING QUALITY is the change in the index of firms’ 
accounting quality from year t-2 to year t-1. All other independent variables are defined analogously. Columns 1 and 
2 present the results from OLS regressions with year fixed effects. The reported estimates are coefficient estimates 
and corresponding t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 
5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Dependent Variable: ΔHHI ΔNUM DEBT TYPES 
  1 2 
ΔACCOUNTING QUALITY -0.012*** 0.046*** 
 (-2.77) (3.53) 
ΔSIZE 0.003 0.012 
 (0.51) (0.65) 
ΔMTB 0.003 -0.009 
 (1.04) (-0.96) 
ΔPROFITABILITY -0.003 0.001 
 (-0.12) (0.01) 
ΔDIVIDEND -0.013 0.054 
 (-1.19) (1.57) 
ΔTANGIBILITY -0.116*** 0.271** 
 (-2.83) (1.98) 
ΔCF VOL -0.031 0.226 
 (-0.45) (1.18) 
ΔR&D 0.050 -0.220 
 (0.86) (-1.47) 
ΔUNRATED 0.028* -0.003 
 (1.81) (-0.06) 
ΔLEVERAGE 0.021 0.015 
 (0.87) (0.21) 
ΔLN(FIRM AGE) -0.140** 0.202 
 (-2.32) (1.08) 
ΔG-INDEX -0.001 0.003 
 (-0.59) (0.42) 
ΔG-INDEX MISSING 0.006 -0.020 
 (0.91) (-0.93) 
ΔLN(SEGMENTS) -0.004 0.005 
 (-0.50) (0.22) 
ΔZ-SCORE -0.001 0.004 
 (-0.31) (0.58) 
ΔASSET GROWTH 0.000 -0.022 
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 (0.05) (-0.98) 
ΔRETURN VOL 0.313* -0.384 
 (1.73) (-0.68) 
ΔRESTRUCTURE 0.082 0.004 
 (1.23) (0.02) 
ΔDEBT AND EQUITY FUNDS RAISED -0.004 0.012 
 (-0.88) (0.84) 
ΔAUDITOR RESIGNATION -0.001 -0.006 
  (-0.07) (-0.14) 
Model Specification OLS OLS 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
No. of Observations 11,090 11,090 
R-squared 0.009 0.008 
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Table 5: Accounting Quality and Debt Concentration – Propensity Score Matching 
 
This table shows estimates of the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration using a propensity score 
matched sample. Panel A presents the results of the Poisson model used to estimate the propensity scores. The 
dependent variable is ACCOUNTING QUALITY, the index of firms’ accounting quality. The reported estimates are 
average marginal effects and corresponding z-statistics. The reported R-squared is the squared correlation coefficient 
between the predicted and observed value of ACCOUNTING QUALITY. Panel B presents a covariate balance test by 
showing the estimated coefficients and corresponding t-statistics on ACCOUNTING QUALITY from OLS regressions 
that regress the different control variables on ACCOUNTING QUALITY and year and firm fixed effects. Panel C 
shows the estimates of the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration in the propensity-score-matched 
sample. HHI is the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of debt concentration in firms’ debt structure, and NUM 
DEBT TYPES is the number of different debt types. Columns 1 and 2 present the results from a firm fixed effects 
Tobit model (FE Tobit) and a correlated random effects Tobit model (CRE Tobit), both censored at zero and one, 
respectively. Column 3 presents the results from a Poisson model with firm fixed effects. All regressions include year 
fixed effects. The reported estimates are average marginal effects and corresponding z-statistics. The reported R-
squared is the squared correlation coefficient between the predicted and observed value of the dependent variable. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm in the FE Tobit and Poisson models. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Poisson Regression of Accounting Quality on Control Variables 
Dependent Variable: ACCOUNTING QUALITY 
SIZE  0.141*** 
 (17.38) 
MTB  -0.035*** 
 (-3.96) 
PROFITABILITY 0.178* 
 (1.76) 
DIVIDEND 0.131*** 
 (5.34) 
TANGIBILITY  0.049 
 (0.65) 
CF VOL  -0.126 
 (-0.66) 
R&D  1.377*** 
 (8.92) 
UNRATED  -0.012 
 (-0.42) 
LEVERAGE 0.141** 
 (2.20) 
LN(FIRM AGE)  -0.035 
 (-0.78) 
G-INDEX  0.010 
 (1.06) 
G-INDEX MISSING  0.050* 
 (1.85) 
LN(SEGMENTS)  -0.067*** 
 (-4.01) 
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Z-SCORE 0.006 
 (0.84) 
ASSET GROWTH  -0.037 
 (-1.27) 
RETURN VOL   -3.219*** 
 (-4.30) 
RESTRUCTURE  0.017 
 (0.06) 
DEBT AND EQUITY FUNDS RAISED  -0.011 
 (-0.52) 
AUDITOR RESIGNATION  -0.735*** 
  (-8.19) 
Model Specification Poisson 
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes 
No. of Observations 15,392 
R-squared 0.217 
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Panel B: Covariate Balance Test 
Dependent Variable: Coefficient t-statistic 
SIZE 0.053 1.40 
MTB 0.012 0.24 
PROFITABILITY  0.007 1.07 
DIVIDEND -0.006 -0.47 
TANGIBILITY 0.002 0.55 
CF VOL 0.005 1.63 
R&D -0.000 -0.07 
UNRATED -0.007 -0.54 
LEVERAGE 0.008 0.95 
LN(FIRM AGE) 0.000 0.14 
G-INDEX -0.035 -1.45 
G-INDEX MISSING 0.010 0.93 
LN(SEGMENTS) 0.041 1.90 
Z-SCORE 0.140 1.57 
ASSET GROWTH 0.017 1.12 
RETURN VOL 0.001 0.83 
RESTRUCTURE -0.002 -1.32 
DEBT AND EQUITY FUNDS RAISED -0.006 -0.26 
AUDITOR RESIGNATION 0.001 0.92 
 
 
Panel C: The Relation between Accounting Quality and Debt Concentration in the Matched Sample 
Dependent Variable: HHI NUM DEBT TYPES 
 1 2 3 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY -0.020**  -0.018***   0.069** 
  (-2.09) (-4.22) (2.27) 
Model Specification FE Tobit CRE Tobit Poisson 
Debt Structure Determinants Yes Yes Yes 
Accounting Quality Determinants Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 4,763 4,763 4,763 
R-squared 0.771 0.141 0.776 
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Table 6: Controlling for Other Debt Structure Characteristics 
 
This table shows estimates of the relation between accounting quality and debt concentration controlling for other 
characteristics of firms’ debt structures. ACCOUNTING QUALITY is the index of firms’ accounting quality. HHI is 
the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of debt concentration in firms’ debt structure, and NUM DEBT TYPES 
is the number of different debt types. PUBLIC DEBT, SENIOR DEBT, and CALLABLE DEBT are the percentages of 
public, senior, and callable debt in firms’ total debt. HHI MATURITY is the measure of concentration of the maturity 
structure of firms’ debt. FIRM-LEVEL COVENANTS is the number of covenants in firms’ outstanding loans and bonds. 
The number of observations is smaller than in Table 2 because information on the additional debt structure 
characteristics is not available for all observations. Columns 1 and 2 present the results from a firm fixed effects Tobit 
model (FE Tobit) and a correlated random effects Tobit model (CRE Tobit), both censored at zero and one, 
respectively. Column 3 presents the results from a Poisson model with firm fixed effects. All regressions include year 
fixed effects. The reported estimates are average marginal effects and corresponding z-statistics. The reported R-
squared is the squared correlation coefficient between the predicted and observed value of the dependent variable. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm in the FE Tobit and Poisson models. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Dependent Variable: HHI NUM DEBT TYPES 
  1 2 3 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.030** 
 (-2.56) (-3.33) (2.45) 
PUBLIC DEBT 0.102*** 0.095*** -0.313*** 
 (8.69) (13.74) (-8.51) 
SENIOR DEBT 0.093*** 0.091*** -0.269*** 
 (4.94) (8.16) (-4.51) 
CALLABLE DEBT 0.063*** 0.065*** -0.187*** 
 (6.14) (8.82) (-5.11) 
HHI MATURITY 0.293*** 0.292*** -0.830*** 
 (27.24)  (40.77) (-24.72) 
FIRM-LEVEL COVENANTS  -0.001 -0.001** 0.001 
  (-1.12) (-2.01) (0.62) 
Model Specification FE Tobit CRE Tobit Poisson 
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Debt Structure Determinants Yes Yes Yes 
Accounting Quality Determinants Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  12,522 12,522 12,522 
R-squared 0.682 0.361 0.645 
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